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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I challenge the long-established view that the term 
phlogiston fails to refer. After a close examination of the reference 
of phlogiston during Lavoisier’s Chemical Revolution, I show that it 
referred throughout to a natural substance, fire matter.   I state that 
Lavoisier eliminated the term but not its referent, which he re-
named caloric, and I claim that it is in the historical and cultural 
context of the Chemical Revolution that the Lavoisier’s intentions 
can be understood.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The fate of  phlogiston was also the fate of many other terms of the 
History of Chemistry before the publication of the Méthode de la 
nomenclature chimique by Lavoisier et al1 in 1787:  spirit of vitriol, 
mineral chermes, oropiment, saffron of Mars, Argentine flower of 
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antimony, tartar acid, to name but a few.  Whereas oropiment no 
longer denotes, phlogiston still denotes, if not a substance found in 
nature or isolated in a laboratory, at least something in which 
chemists believed, during a period in the history of Chemistry.  
However, it is almost a topic in texts on the History and Philosophy of 
Science that the term phlogiston fails to refer.  It is generally 
accepted that it does not refer to a substance, but it is also a 
common belief that the term phlogiston denotes that substance 
that 17th and 18th century chemists actually believed to exist, and 
which was defined in many – perhaps too many—ways.     
 
In this paper, I develop the idea that the term phlogiston did refer 
for a long time, and throughout the revolution initiated by Lavoisier; 
that phlogiston referred to a natural substance, fire matter. I claim 
that Lavoisier eliminated the term but not its referent, which he re-
named “caloric”.  I will also show that Lavoisier never had the 
explicit intention that the referent of phlogiston should cease to 
exist, but rather intended to discard the term, substituting it by a 
different one.   Finally, I suggest some of the reasons that might 
explain that explicit intention. 
 
This paper also sheds light on the problematic relationship between 
Philosophy and History of Science post-Lakatos, often considered a 
repository of potential reconstructions that exemplify philosophical 
theses à la mode.  This paper is inscribed within an alternative 
program that emphasizes a much richer relation between History 
and Philosophy of Science which is being promoted particularly by 
Chang (2004), called “Complementary Science” or “History and 
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Philosophy of Science as Science by Other Means”, an  initiative 
that I will develop in future works. 
 
 
2. The term phlogiston and the notion of failure to refer.  
 
Finding out which term – scientific or otherwise—fails to refer is for 
Eco (1997) an extremely complex business: both felicitous reference 
and failure to refer must be negotiated: there is no privileged 
access, free of human contingencies, to the reference of a term or 
the absence thereof.  Causal theories of reference, for instance, 
provide a regulative (I would dare say normative) notion that 
reflects our concern about referring to the world by means of 
language: in order to refer to something, we need the regulative 
idea of an ontological reference.  For Eco (1997), this regulative 
idea operates even when we refer to impossibilia or inconceivable 
objects.  Given the fact that causal scholars have posited that we 
can refer to objects we would not know how to determine, 
recognize, locate or even interpret, it seems evident that we can 
also refer to inconceivable objects: we do use language in this way, 
simply because reference is one of the ways in which we can use 
language. Evidently this is not the case of the term phlogiston: 
phlogiston is neither inconceivable nor impossible, nor, alas, existent.  
 
From a representational-physicalist point of departure (Devitt and 
Sterelny 1987), a term fails to refer if it has no ontological grounds.  
Phlogiston fails to refer because it has no physical existence. The 
question is: who can assert that phlogiston does not exist? 
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Nowadays, everyone does, fundamentally and primarily because 
science (and not merely Chemistry) has established it as a fact.  The 
process that led to this result is extremely complex, lengthy and 
multi-dimensional. It involves factors of several kinds: cognitive, 
social, political, historical, as well as ontological, and this is the only 
wedge I will drive in this thorny mass. I will not assert that phlogiston 
once existed and then ceased to exist, as is the case with dinosaurs, 
mainly because determining what exists and what does not exist 
must be found out through a very laborious process of scientific 
research.  We could say that science allows us to snoop into what 
exists and what, sometimes mistakenly, is supposed to exist.  This 
inquiry demands that we take sides with the “referents” and follow 
their journey, even when they end up not being physical-existent or 
existing objects.2 
 
According to Stahl,3 a particular principle -- phlogiston or “fire 
matter”-- was released when combustible bodies were subjected to 
a pronounced increase in temperature.   This fire matter is emitted in 
combustion, in the form of flame and heat.  Combustible bodies are 
therefore constituted by that substance, together with a 
considerable amount of “earth”.  When metals are heated, they 
lose this substance, turning into metallic calx. Metals are, according 
to Stahl, combustible bodies formed by the union of one earth or 
calx and the inflammable principle.  Reciprocally, adding 
phlogiston to a metallic calx would be enough to rebuild the 
primitive metal, and this was an experiment frequently carried out 
by Stahl himself and later chemists.  In fact, this was possible by 
heating the calx with a combustible body such as oil, charcoal or 
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sulfur, all of them particularly rich in phlogiston.  In this way, the 
theory of phlogiston not only related the formation of metallic alkali 
to combustion, but it also made it possible to link the heating of 
bodies with the production of flame and heat and with animal 
breathing, which was supposed to serve to exhale the phlogiston 
fixed in the human body.  Thus a multitude of diverse phenomena 
were gathered in one and the same general conception.  
 
Phlogiston also had the power to transport itself from one body to 
another, conveying to its host the property of being inflammable.  
According to Marcellin Berthelot, one of the defenders of Lavoisier’s 
Chemistry, this theory -- “so clear, so in accordance with general 
appearances” (Berthelot 1890 p.35) -- was abandoned with 
reluctance.   Only Priestley and la Métherie remained obstinately 
faithful to it throughout their lives.  Cavendish, another prominent 
English chemist, did not dispute Lavoisier’s “anti-phlogistic” theory 
but he did not commit to it either, as was the case of several other 
European chemists throughout the 18th century.  The most 
remarkable case is possibly Kirwan, who fiercely fought against the 
phlogiston theory for some time, made some extremely relevant 
discoveries, and ended up by declaring in black and white his 
conversion to Lavoisier’s theory.  
 
Most historians of the Chemical Revolution of the 18th century seem 
to agree that the discovery of gases other than ordinary air --
ignored until the second half of the 18th century-- changed the face 
of Chemistry, introducing a huge and completely unexpected 
amount of data. In 1767 Cavendish proved the existence and 
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determined the characteristic of inflammable air, a new gas which, 
thanks to Lavoisier, we can identify today as hydrogen.  Between 
1771 and 1774 Priestley manage to isolate and name “the main 
gases known today” (Berthelot, 1890. p. 39), including 
“dephlogisticized air” or oxygen base according to Lavoisier’s 
nomenclature; “nitrous air” or nitric oxide as Lavoisier called it, and 
“dephlogisticized nitrous air”.  These findings had a great impact on 
the community of Chemists, since they made it possible to abandon 
the old conception according to which air was a simple element 
(together with earth, water and fire).  With this discovery, the idea 
that air was a substance in a certain state, a state of matter, that 
the gaseous state was a physical and not a chemical 
phenomenon, began to gain acceptance. 
 
Whereas Priestley experimentally observed that air decomposed, he 
interpreted this phenomenon as a combination of air with 
phlogiston or fire matter: the phlogiston theory seemed to benefit 
from this interpretation, since the principle, until then invisible, could 
be equated to an experimental reality.  Hence phlogiston becomes 
the principle of fire responsible for combustion, and its release would 
explain the heat and light produced in this process.  It is invisible, it is 
concealed, and it is impossible to isolate, because it is always found 
fixed to an earthy substance.  
 
Stahl’s doctrine is often reduced, even by Lavoisier, to phlogiston 
theory, even though it is much further-reaching.  Several historical 
studies, among them those of Pierre Duhem (1902), Emile Meyerson 
(1902) and Hélène Metzger (1930, 1933, 1935), insist that Stahl’s 
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Chemistry constituted an important system – the first chemical 
system adopted throughout Europe—which made it possible to 
explain a large number of phenomena, among them those 
mentioned above.  But above all, Stahl’s Chemistry is grounded on 
a philosophy of matter which, even though it is corpuscular, is 
opposed to mechanism.  According to Bensaude-Vincent (1989), 
Stahl admitted the existence of indivisible particles, but he resisted 
the idea of a single, uniform matter.   
 
 Thanks to Stahl’s success, the old conception of elements-principles, 
universal components of matter and carriers of its features, is still in 
force during the 18th century.  It is not a relic of an exhausted 
alchemical tradition but the grounds of an ambitious chemical 
science, keen to affirm its originality.  (Bensaude-Vincent, 1989, p. 419, 
my translation) 
 
Let’s bear in mind that the four elements are then not vague 
principles, something like supports of properties; on the contrary, 
they are defined as simple bodies, accessible to experience.  How 
did Lavoisier come to question the theory of phlogiston? Historians 
of the chemical revolution -- with the exception of the so-called 
relativists, including Kuhn -- attribute this to an experiment and to 
the scales or weight system that Lavoisier relentlessly applied.  
Lavoisier was working on the relation between air and fire, and after 
several readings he adopted the idea that every substance can 
exist in the three states of aggregation –solid, liquid or gaseous—
depending on the quantity of  fire matter combined.   
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Even though from 1772 to 1782 Lavoisier conceived a revolutionary 
project – according to Figuier (1879), Berthelot (1890) and 
Bensaude-Vincent (1989) - he did not express himself immediately in 
those terms; he would wait until 1787 for that.  His publications 
against phlogiston are extremely prudent.  In his account Mémoire 
sur la combustion en générale (1777) he points to the need to go 
beyond facts when it comes to formulating hypotheses, and he 
presents his own, the result of an inductive, generalizing 
methodology, based on a series of methodically conducted 
experiments, with precise measurements, repetitions, variations and 
verifications.  In his theory of combustion, however, one cannot yet 
observe the suppression of the elements-principles Lavoisier needs 
to explain the release of heat and light in combustion, which he 
ascribes to a release of the caloric contained in air.   
 
It is usual to affirm that antiphlogistic theory is the opposite, the 
inverse, of phlogiston theory.  It is also usual to state that phlogiston 
theory posited that something was always liberated in combustion 
and that, on the contrary, Lavoisier’s theory posited that in every 
combustion something is absorbed.  From this perspective, grosso 
modo, it does seem that the two theories oppose each other.  On 
closer scrutiny, however, it takes a much more thorough 
understanding to see where the inversion lies.   
 
In logical terms, from the fact that in combustion something is 
absorbed it does not necessarily follow that something else cannot 
be released, and reciprocally, from the fact that in a combustion 
something is released, it does not necessarily follow that something 
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else might not also be absorbed.  In order to elucidate the inversion 
what matters the most is what phlogiston was and where it was 
found: phlogiston was fire matter and was found in combustible 
bodies.  If a combustible body combusted, it liberated the fire 
matter it contained, that is to say, it emitted heat, light and/or 
flame.  For Lavoisier, phlogiston did not exist in combustible bodies: 
in a nutshell, what Lavoisier denied was not the material existence 
of phlogiston but rather one of the tenets of phlogiston theory, 
namely that fire matter was contained in combustible bodies.  He 
was opposed, then, to the idea of the presence of fire matter in 
combustible bodies. But he also affirmed that in every combustion a 
new body was fixed, namely the base of élan vital or oxygen: 
combustible bodies did not contain phlogiston --which does not 
mean that it did not exist-- and when they combusted they 
absorbed the base of élan vital or oxygen, liberating fire matter, or 
caloric, or light, or flame, or all of the above.  Indeed, so far there 
are no opposites.  Another claim of Lavoisier’s will be necessary to 
understand what the opposition consisted in.  For Lavoisier, the 
cause of combustion and heat release was the fixation of the base 
of the élan vital or oxygen in the bodies, whereas for Stahl the 
cause of combustion was phlogiston, that is to say, the fire matter 
that was one of the constituents of combustible bodies together 
with other, generally earthy, substances.  Lavoisier denies the 
presence of the fire matter in combustible bodies and denies that 
the cause of all combustion should be phlogiston, but he does not 
deny the existence of the fire matter, and hence he needs to find 
another cause for combustion –in this case, oxygen— without 
denying the evident:  that combustion produces, emits, releases, 
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heat, light and/or flame (and smoke, in the combustion of organic 
materials).   Something is released in combustion, not just for 
supporters of the phlogiston theory so ridiculed by Lavoisier in 
Réflexions sur le phlogistique (1783).  From the fact that Lavoisier 
would not deny the existence of fire matter it does not follow either 
that it should have a place in his system; he could simply neglect it, 
fail to introduce it in his theory.  But indeed this was not the case.  
Where did fire matter end up?  In order to answer this question, I will 
have to concentrate on two of Lavoisier’s works: his Mémoire sur la 
combustion en générale (1777) and Réflexions (1783).  
 
In Lavoisier (1777) we come across the four constant phenomena 
which he believes obey “laws by which nature always abides” (1777 
p.226).  The first three are: 
 
1. “In all combustion the fire matter or of light matter is released” 
(1777p.226). 
2. “Bodies cannot burn but in a small number of kinds of air, or 
rather, there cannot be combustion but in one kind of air, 
that which Priestley has named dephlogisticized air and I shall 
here name pure air.” (1777p.226) 
3. “In all combustion there is destruction or decomposition of the 
pure air in which combustion takes place, and weight of the 
burnt body increases in proportion to the quantity of 
destroyed or decomposed air”. (1777 p.227) 
 
Lavoisier immediately adds that, 
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... these different phenomena of calcination of metals and 
combustion are explained in a quite felicitous manner in Stahl’s 
hypothesis; one must suppose, as he does, that there is matter of fire, 
phlogiston, fixed in metals, in sulfur and in each one of the bodies he 
considers combustible.  But if one asks the followers of Stahl’s doctrine 
to prove the existence of fire matter in combustible bodies, they 
necessarily fall into a vicious circle and are forced to answer that 
combustible bodies contain fire matter because they burn, and they 
burn because they contain fire matter; it is easy to see in this last 
analysis that this amounts to explaining combustion through 
combustion. (1777 pp. 227-228 italics added) 
 
It is easy to see the depth of Lavoisier’s logical –fundamentally 
logical-- misgivings against the followers of “Stahl’s doctrine”. Both 
Figuier (1879) and Berthelot (1891) insist emphatically on this point.  
The former considers Lavoisier (1783) “a masterpiece of logic”, if not 
of Chemistry.  Someone might pause to reflect on this insistence and 
wonder if a revolution might be a mere inversion, or even what 
caused an inversion to become a scientific revolution. The first 
question shows perplexity; indeed, several historians of science have 
affirmed that the radical change (what is an inversion if not this?) 
that took place in the history of Chemistry would never have 
constituted a scientific revolution without the acknowledgment of 
the manifest, explicit, and consistent intention of its author, Lavoisier. 
 
The existence of fire matter, phlogiston, in metals, sulfur, etc., is 
therefore no more than a hypothesis, an assumption which, once 
admitted, explains, it is true, some calcinations and combustion 
phenomena; but if I show that those same phenomena can also be 
easily explained by the opposite hypothesis, that is to say, without 
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supposing that neither fire matter nor phlogiston, exists, in bodies 
called combustible, Stahl’s system is shaken to its foundations. (1777 
p.228, italics added) 
 
Surely someone might like to ask Lavoisier what exactly he 
understands by the “fire matter, or phlogiston” he mentions in the 
previous passage and in many others. Lavoisier would answer “with 
Franklin, Boërhaave and some of the philosophers of Antiquity, that 
the fire matter or of light is a very subtle, very elastic fluid, that 
enfolds our planet, penetrating more or less easily those bodies that 
compose it and tends, when it is free, to balance in all of them). 
(1777 p.228, italics added).  
 
Lavoisier refuses to abandon this definition, even in the Traité 
élementaire de chimie of 1789, his last work; it belongs to his system, 
it plays an important part in it, and he will intentionally redub this 
referent as “caloric”.  Fire matter is everywhere and it constitutes 
one of the imponderable matters, the imponderable matter par 
excellence; in fact, Lavoisier is known as the first scholar to posit the 
distinction between ponderable and imponderable matter.  
However, there is a particular state, the aeriform state, (neither solids 
nor combustible bodies-- the reader will recall that when Stahl 
developed his theory gases were not known) that needs fire matter: 
 
. . . every aeriform fluid, all kinds of air, are the result of the 
combination of any body whatsoever, solid or fluid, with the fire 
matter or light, and aeriform fluids owe to this combination their 
elasticity, their specific lightness, their faintness and all the other 
properties that make them close to igneous fluid. … The same 
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happens to air during combustion, the body that is burnt takes away 
its base; then the fire matter, which served as solvent, is released, it 
claims back all its rights and it escapes with its known features, that is 
with flame, heat and light (1777 p.229, italics added). 
 
Fire matter is no longer combined with earths, it is combined with 
airs.  The élan vital is a combination of oxygen, or base of the élan 
vital, and fire matter.  Every air will be for Lavoisier the combination 
of fire matter and the body in its gaseous state which will form the 
gas base: there is no gas without fire matter, hence one can hardly 
consider dephlogisticized air –pure air, as Lavoisier calls it—an air.  
For a substance to be aeriform it must be combined with fire matter 
or phlogiston, hence Lavoisier’s belief that Priestley improperly 
named that air “dephlogisticized air”, not because of its linguistic 
and conceptual associations but because it did not exist.  In 
Lavoisier’s nomenclature, it corresponds to the base of élan vital or 
oxygen (pure air, as he called it in 1777), not to élan vital itself, and 
of course oxygen or base of élan vital is far easier to breathe than 
élan vital itself.  Hence Lavoisier has no objections to the word 
“dephlogisticized”; his problem lies with the notion of “air”: it is 
unlikely for an air not to be combined with fire matter.  
 
Pure air, Priestley’s dephlogisticized air, is therefore, in my opinion, the 
true combustible body and perhaps the only one in nature, and it can 
be seen that, in order to explain combustion phenomena, there is no 
longer any need to assume the existence of a large amount of fire 
fixed in all the bodies we call combustible and, on the contrary, it is 
very likely that there might exist in small quantities in metals, sulfur and 
phosphorus and in most very solid, heavy compact bodies; and it is 
still possible that in these substances there might not exist but the free 
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fire matter, in virtue of the property It has of balancing with the bodies 
that surround it. (1777 p.231) 
 
This conceptual change where fire matter is not fixed but 
combined, will allow Lavoisier to develop one of his most important 
contributions: the notion that matter (which is always conserved for 
this author) can present itself in three states of aggregation, liquid, 
solid or gaseous, and if this is so, it is thanks to the participation of 
free fire or fire matter: 
 
These three states do not depend on anything other than the greater 
or lesser amount of fire matter that penetrates those bodies and is 
combined with them.  Fluidity, vaporization, elasticity are, therefore, 
the characteristic properties of the presence of fire and of a great 
amount of it; on the contrary, solidity, compactness, are proofs of its 
absence.  Likewise, it is proven that aeriform substances, and air itself, 
contain a large amount of combined fire, it is also likely that solid 
bodies contain it in small amounts. (1777 p.231, italics added) 
 
The referent of phlogiston is still present in antiphlogistic Chemistry.  
The multiple senses that the term phlogiston had during the sixty-
year heydays of phlogiston theory, however, are no longer to be 
found.  Almost all the descriptions of phlogiston elaborated with the 
purpose of saving it from contradiction and principle begging 
disappear in Lavoisier’s system, but fire matter does not. Some of its 
properties, too few actually, change -- for instance, it is not fixed but 
combined-- but the main changes are its function and location: it is 
no longer found in combustible bodies (since they tend to be solid) 
but rather, and in important quantities, in aeriform fluids or gases.  It 
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will no longer be the cause of combustion but it has an important 
participation in it, to the extent that it makes of élan vital or oxygen, 
according to Lavoisier, the universal cause of combustion.   It would 
still take many years for heat to be considered an interchange of 
thermal energy, and to this day there is disagreement about what 
the nature of fire actually is. 
 
This interpretation could be challenged by arguing that fire is 
material but not substantial, that Lavoisier was certain about its 
materiality but not about its substantiality. The only justification for 
this interpretation is the idea that fire is an imponderable body, and 
since substances tend to have extension, fire matter would not be a 
substance.  
 
Lavosier, however, considered fire matter to be substantial; in 
Réflexions (1783), the substantiality of fire matter is determined with 
precision: fire is an element, and not in the sense of “principle or 
component of all things”, but in Lavoisier’s sense, namely that an 
element is a simple, even indivisible substance, which can 
sometimes be measured and manipulated, combined, extracted, 
etc., at will.  Fire matter is a laboratory substance like many other 
elements, among them oxygen; Lavoisier (1783 p.627) adds: “… this 
element, this subtle fluid, probably obeys, like all the others, the laws 
of attraction, but its weight is so slight that it cannot be revealed by 
means of any physical experience”.  
 
In any case, it cannot have been easy for an experimentalist like 
the French chemist to deal with the nature of fire; he was 
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convinced of its substantiality, but he could not prove 
experimentally how he knew this: weighing elements, reactions, 
residue, etc.  Fire matter had weight but it was not measurable with 
the instruments available at the time. Lavoisier’s conviction was so 
strong that he chose a curious metaphor to allude to the elemental 
character of fire matter, that of water.  Fire does not dry, like air; for 
Lavoisier, fire “soaks”, penetrates, invades, fills, saturates.4 
 
I could almost say that every body in nature is, with respect to heat 
matter, what a sponge is for water: if you squeeze a sponge you 
reduce the small cells that retain water; if you let them expand, they 
will immediately be able to contain more water. (1783 p.653) 
 
This substantial feature of fire matter, of course, will be the Achilles’ 
heel of anti-phlogiston Chemistry, but this won’t happen until the 
end of the 19th century.  The new name Lavoisier chooses to design 
fire matter, “caloric”, does not change the referent of phlogiston; it 
only changes to some extent the concept of phlogiston, since it can 
exist in free or combined states and not just in a fixed state as Stahl 
believed.  It also changes its name, and this for reasons and 
intentions very precisely established by Lavoisier.   Below we shall 
look into what it is that Lavoisier rejects about phlogiston theory and 
how he does so.  
 
 
3) A minimal case study of a relevant difference: presence vs. 
existence. 
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Réflexions starts with a reference to Lavoisier’s great discovery; he 
states that by admitting his principle, the main difficulties in 
Chemistry “fade and dissipate and all phenomena are explained 
with surprising ease”  (1783 p.623) 
 
But if in Chemistry everything is explained in a satisfactory manner 
without the aid of phlogiston, this only indicates that it is very likely that 
this principle does not exist, that it is only a hypothetical entity, a 
gratuitous supposition; indeed, it is a rule of good logic not to multiply 
entities needlessly. (1783 p.623) 
 
Prima facie, this passage, quoted in most textbooks of the History of 
Chemistry, not only suggests but underscores the fact that, for 
Lavoisier, phlogiston is a hypothetical and gratuitous entity which, in 
virtue of good logic, calls for Occam’s razor.  However, the only 
thing Lavoisier denies is that phlogiston is fixed to combustible 
bodies; in other words, he denies the presence in bodies of 
phlogiston, but not its existence. Rather than confusing, the passage 
is biased.  Lavoisier later affirms that the phlogiston hypothesis has 
been an “ill-fated mistake for Chemistry” (1783 p.673), that it has 
considerably hindered its progress – let us recall that Stahl’s theory 
had barely been in force for sixty years, by all means a short period 
from a historical perspective—and this only due to “the flawed way 
of philosophizing it has introduced” (1783 p.623).  Several historians 
of Chemistry agree that the phlogiston theory was historically and a 
logically a condition for Lavoisier’s Chemistry, but the treatment it 
receives at the hands of the French chemist in the first pages of this 
work, would seem more fitting for alchemy than for phlogiston 
theory – something that several historians also point out. 
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Lavoisier continues this Mémoire sur la combustion en générale 
(1777) by begging the reader to forget that Stahl’s theory ever 
existed, and follows this request with his own account of the 
phlogiston theory.  According to Lavoisier, phlogiston theory only 
stated about combustion, “what the senses tell us: the release of 
heat and light” (1783 p. 624) In other words, that which is released in 
any combustion, both for Stahl and for Lavoisier.   
 
Nothing is more natural, in fact, than saying that combustible 
bodies burn because they contain an inflammable principle; but 
we owe to Stahl two important discoveries, independent of any 
system, any hypothesis, and which will be eternal truths; firstly, 
that metals are combustible bodies, that calcination is a true 
combustion. (1783 pp.624-625, italics added) 
 
The other important universal discovery of Stahl’s was, according to 
Lavoisier, that the property of burning can be transmitted from one 
body to another.  From this Stahl inferred, in Lavoisier’s account, that 
phlogiston could pass from one body to another and that it obeyed 
certain laws that were later called “affinities”. However, says 
Lavoisier, Stahl did not explain a long-known phenomenon, verified 
by Boyle (1627-1691), namely that all combustible bodies gain 
weight after being burned or calcined.  If when a body is burnt it 
releases phlogiston, metals should lose weight instead of gaining it.  
To solve this limitation, Stahl’s followers posited a huge amount of ad 
hoc hypotheses and Lavoisier will criticize and destroy them one by 
one in this text – all except one: the sense that fixes   the reference 
of phlogiston to the fire matter, heat and light  --alas the single 
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description perfectly observable!--: what is released, emitted, 
liberated in every combustion.  After demolishing all the hypotheses 
that attempted to solve that limitation, Lavoisier laments that  
 
No matter how demonstrative the experiences I have used as 
support, it has become customary to doubt facts.  Therefore, those 
who try to persuade the public that everything that is new is false, or 
that everything that is true is not new, have even found, in an ancient 
author, the seed of this discovery. (1783 p.629 italics added) 
 
These exceedingly intelligent words will give place to the real 
criticism of the followers of the phlogiston theory, much more than 
of the theory of phlogiston itself, and to phlogiston tout court; in his 
criticism of Macquer, one of the most remarkable followers of the 
phlogiston theory in Lavoisier’s time, he points out that Macquer 
ends up by appropriating his own finding to make it work in the 
phlogiston theory, something unacceptable for the self-nominated 
revolutionary, Lavoisier.  
 
It is surprising to see how Mr. Macquer, seemingly defending Stahl’s 
doctrine in conserving the denomination of phlogiston, presents a 
completely new theory, which is not at all Stahl’s: phlogiston, the 
inflammable principle, that weighty principle, composed by the fire 
element and the earthy element, is substituted by the pure matter of 
light; so Mr. Macquer has kept the word without keeping the thing 
and, pretending to defend Stahl’s doctrine, he has conducted quite 
an attack on it. (1783 p.630, italics added)5 
 
Lavoisier’s actual criticism, in my opinion, is not aimed at what the 
phlogiston theorists had made of phlogiston, a “vague idea” that 
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no-one had defined “rigorously”, a designation under which 
irreconcilable and contradictory properties had fallen: phlogiston is 
a “true Proteus, shifting shapes all the time” (1783 p.640).  Lavoisier 
was concerned with the reference of phlogiston, by the 
determination of its reference.  On finding that phlogiston theorists 
had given the term so many modes of reference, Lavoisier changes 
the term phlogiston for “caloric” to refer to the same entity: the fire 
matter.  The argument against phlogiston theory in Réflextions sur de 
flogistique is a logical and linguistic argument.  In fact, by the end of 
this text, Lavoisier spells out once more the four phenomena present 
in  every combustion, which he had already formulated in 1777, 
without conceptual changes of any kind.  The only changes that 
can be observed are linguistic: the term “dephlogisticized” air has 
disappeared.  Lavoisier finishes his 1783 Mémoire  by stating that its 
aim was, among others, to show that “Stahl’s phlogiston is an 
imaginary entity whose existence had been arbitrarily assumed in 
metals, sulfur, phosphorus, and in every combustible body” (1783 
pp. 654-655, italics added).   
 
Fire matter, in fact, emerges all the stronger from this Mémoire: it is 
not an imaginary entity, even though it may not be found in 
combustible bodies, but rather it surrounds all bodies, combined 
with the bases of gases and other solids, depending on its 
compactness, “soaking” everything, even Lavoisier himself, who no 
doubt breathed like every common mortal.   
 
Since phlogiston refers to everything, for Lavoisier, both to “a” as to 
“not a”, both to “b” and to “not b”, it became necessary for the 
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French chemist to eliminate it and substitute it.  Nothing happened, 
however, with the original referent of phlogiston; the fire matter 
continues to be studied by pneumatic Chemistry, or the Chemistry 
of Lavoisier, or modern Chemistry, or even antiphlogistic Chemistry.  
 
 
4. The role of scientific language for Lavoisier.6 
 
The lexical work of Guyton de Morveau and other 18th century 
authors culminated with the publication, in 1787, of an important 
work signed by four French chemists of the period: Antoine Laurent 
Lavoisier, Antoine Fourcroy, Claude Louis Berthollet and Guyton de 
Morveau himself. His Méthode de la nomenclature chimique 
contains a systematic set of rules to name substances based on 
Lavoisier’s ideas, which, among other aspects, involved 
abandoning the theory of phlogiston and the consolidation of new 
ideas on chemical composition.  
 
The changes that took place in both explanations about Chemistry 
and in the language of Chemistry, together with the fact that they 
were finally recognized as a revolution, both by its protagonists and 
by later authors, have led later historians of science such as Thomas 
S. Kuhn, to claim that the “chemical revolution is a paradigmatic 
example of a scientific revolution” (1962: 150). According to the 
mainstream interpretation, this “revolution” consisted in the 
abandonment of the phlogiston theory and its replacement by a 
theory of combustion based on the action of oxygen.  The 
development of pneumatic Chemistry, which led to the isolation of 
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several gases and to the study of their chemical reactions, together 
with the introduction of quantification in Chemistry, with the 
systematic use of the scales and the law of conservation of mass 
were, according to this interpretation, the main causes of this crisis.  
This widespread image of the chemical revolution has been 
discussed by several authors who have toned down the 
revolutionary character of the changes that had taken place 
during those years, and have shown the existence of a rich tradition 
of chemical research throughout the 18th century, which was not 
focused on the problems traditionally associated with the chemical 
revolution.  
 
Phlogiston theory, however, presented an important problem, as I 
have already mentioned, with regards to the weight of the 
substances that participated in combustions.  This was Lavoisier’s 
decisive argument: how to explain the long-known fact that the 
residues of combustion weighed more that the original metal?  
Some authors proposed the ad hoc hypothesis of the negative 
weight of phlogiston.  But this was illogical for Lavoisier, who around 
1772 started to elaborate and defend in his Mémoires presented to 
the Académie des Sciences the idea that this increase in weight 
was due to the fixation of a part of the élan vital in the metal, so 
that the fire matter or caloric was released and the corresponding 
calix was formed.  Lavoisier called this part of the élan vital 
“acidifying principle” and later “oxygen principle”, since he 
considered it the principle that conferred on substances their acid 
character.  After the discovery of acid that did not contain oxygen, 
mainly with the electrochemical experiments of Humphry Davy 
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(1778-1829), Lavoisier’s ideas were questioned, but the term 
“oxygen” has remained in use to date.  
 
Against the background of this chemical revolution the Méthode de 
la nomenclature chimique (1787) was published.  Its point of 
departure was the new concept of chemical composition 
consolidated during the 18th century.  The point of departure of the 
new nomenclature was the list of simple substances elaborated by 
Lavoisier taking as a point of departure the well-known definition 
that proposed to “consider as simple every substance that couldn’t 
be decomposed” (1789 p. 7). Pretending to have eliminated 
phlogiston from the face of Chemistry, metals became simple 
substances and calixes substances composed by a metal and 
oxygen. Nevertheless, some substances such as calix and 
magnesium (compound substances), appeared on the famous list 
of thirty three simple substances in Lavoisier’s  Traité élémentaire de 
chimie (1789), since they had not been analyzed so far.  
 
The list also included some “radicals” such as “muriatic radical”, 
“fluoric radical” or “boracic radical”, since for Lavoisier the 
corresponding acids were not simple substances but rather formed 
by these radicals plus oxygen, in spite of the fact that it had  been 
impossible to analyze.  
 
The distinction between simple and compound substances made it 
possible to establish clearly different names for both types of 
substances.  In Méthode de la nomenclature chimique simple 
substances are designated with a single name, without much 
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consideration of the criterion employed to coin such term.   On the 
list of elements proposed by Lavoisier we find terms formed 
according to the chemical properties of the element (oxygen, 
hydrogen), others derived from the name of the mineral they came 
from (tungsten), and even names taken from the alchemical 
tradition (mercury).  The authors of the Méthode disregarded the 
names of the elements which, in general, had been in use until 
then.  
 
The opposite happened with the terms used to designate 
compound substances whose number was, already at that time, far 
larger than that of simple substances.  Compound substances were 
designated by means of binary names, in which the roots of the 
names of the elements were used to indicate their chemical 
composition.  Hence a substance that had been until then 
designated with names such as “vitriolic tartar”, “duplicated 
archane”, or “Glaser sal polychrest” became “sulfate of potassa”, a 
term that refers to the substances that come into its composition.  
This method led not only to the elimination of multiple synonyms 
employed to name a single substance but also to the establishment 
of a single criterion, chemical composition, to name compound 
substances.  
 
Another problem that the authors of the Méthode had to solve was 
the terms employed to designate compound substances with 
identical elements albeit in different proportions.  In this case, the 
use of expressions which indicated only the elements of the 
compound was not appropriate, since the same name could 
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conceal the fact that the denoted substances had very different 
properties.  For instance, the use of the expression “copper oxide”, 
in which only the chemical composition of the compound is 
mentioned, is confusing, since it can be applied both to a red solid 
and to a black oxidant powder.  In order to solve this problem, the 
authors of the new nomenclature introduced several prefixes and 
suffixes that provided information about the proportion in which 
those elements were present in the compound.  
 
The Méthode was received in different ways by the different groups 
interested in Chemistry in European countries.  For instance Priestley, 
who would never accept Lavoisier’s ideas on combustion, also 
rejected most of these new terms, considering that they were based 
on principles that had not been sufficiently established (Berthelot 
1890).  However, in most cases the new nomenclature was 
accepted, even by those chemists who did not fully subscribe to 
Lavoisier’s new ideas on combustion.  Some of these authors 
proposed variations:  for instance, the term “azote” was rejected 
and in its place the present denomination, ‘nitrogen’ was proposed.  
It is worth mentioning that the translator of the text of the four 
French chemists did not follow steadily Lavoisier’s 
recommendations; the most striking case was that of his German 
translators, who decided to German roots (instead of Greek, as the 
authors of the nomenclature recommended), and coined terms 
such as ‘Sauerstoff’ or ‘Wasserstoff’, which have similar meanings to 
‘oxygen’ and ‘hydrogen’ respectively.   
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In spite of diverse modifications, the ideas of the Méthode were 
enormously influential on later Chemistry, most particularly on 
inorganic Chemistry.  The use of roots that design the elements of 
the compound and different suffixes and prefixes that inform about 
the relative proportion of those elements is still the basis of a large 
part of the terminology of inorganic Chemistry.  Lavoisier’s 
nomenclature also contained a system of symbols designed by 
Jean Henri Hassenfratz (1755-1827) and Pierre Auguste Adet (1763-
1834).  However, and due among other things to the typographical 
difficulties of reproducing these symbols in books, its diffusion was 
quite limited. At the beginning of the 19th century, the new notation 
introduced by Jacob Berzelius, very similar to the modern chemical 
formulae, overthrew Hassenfratz and Adet’s proposal. 
 
If we follow the series of works by Lavoisier in all the Mémoires 
presented to the Académie des Sciences, it is possible to witness 
almost step by step the creation of modern Chemistry, albeit with 
terms from the old tradition, that of phlogiston and pneumatic 
Chemistry, to which Lavoisier belonged.  I do not witness, however, 
any problems of incommunicability, untranslatability, 
incomparability, or unintelligibility7.  Even though we are witnessing 
a conceptual change of enormous proportions both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, the phenomena described under the notion of 
semantic incommensurability are non-existent.  What, then, led 
Lavoisier to conceive a project such as a change of language in 
Chemistry? Figuier (1879) believes that Lavoisier and the other 
authors of the Nomenclature,  
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In order to consolidate the foundations of pneumatic theory and to 
break all ties with the past, the French chemists conceived the project 
of completely reforming chemical language, and to establish for all 
compounds a system of nominal designation, according to the 
theories of the new school…. It is clear that by introducing in the 
language the new truths, forcing ideas to enter in the soul through the 
artifice of words, he contributed to the consolidation and 
propagation of the new Chemistry as powerfully as the discoveries 
that fixated its evidence.  (1879 pp 475-476.). 
 
Thanks, among other things, to the discoveries developed in his 
Mémoires, Lavoisier manages to surround himself with allies; only 
afterwards does he initiate his task of undermining the old system: 
the reformation of language.  For some decades chemists had 
been complaining about the imperfections of their nomenclature.  
The names of chemical substances coined throughout the centuries 
and sanctioned by use, perpetuated to perfection a tradition but 
transmitted, at times, false ideas.  Moreover, the discoveries of new 
substances in the 19th century demanded the creation of new 
designations.  
 
Lavoisier, persuaded of the importance of words in the shaping of 
ideas by his reading of Abbot Étienne de Condillac, used this 
opportunity to make one of his wishes come true: to break with the 
past and to be reborn through dubbing. The Méthode is completed 
by a “Dictionary” which records the equivalences between the new 
and old names, insofar as the old names did not conceal “false 
ideas”.  We find, for instance, “deflogisticized air” and “flogisticized 
air”; what we do not find in this “Dictionary” is phlogiston, not even 
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as an ‘imaginary entity’ or ‘Stahl’s hypothetical entity’.  It seems that 
‘phlogiston’ was the only term that, for Lavoisier, enclosed false 
ideas -- or perhaps the explanation for this remarkable absence lies 
elsewhere.  If we look up ‘caloric’, however, we will find it, and next 
to its corresponding “old name” we will read the following: “Igneous 
fluid. Fire. Fire or heat matter”: that is to say, the referents of 
‘phlogiston’.  Even though the authors show concern for continuity, 
keeping the old names that do not conceal “false ideas”, the 
Nomenclature is the key to the transformation of a nascent 
Chemistry.  It is not simply the proposal of a school, of a new 
chemical theory, it is  
 
 An irreversible rupture from the past: in one generation chemists 
forget their natural language consolidated by centuries of use.  The 
previous texts become illegible and are relegated to an obscure 
prehistory.  A rupture also between academic and craft-like 
Chemistry… It is the end of the age of the Encyclopedia, when a 
chemist such as Venel could proudly say that ‘Chemistry comprises a 
twofold language, the popular and the scientific one. (Besaude-
Vincent, 1989 p. 424, italics added) 
 
It is in the Traité élémentaire de chemieof 1789, a summary of his old 
Mémoires presented before the Académie and translated into the 
new nomenclature, where we can observe the relevance of 
language for science in Lavoisier’s opinion.  In fact, the 
revolutionary chemist places his Traité under the eminent patronage 
of a contemporary philosopher, Condillac.  A reading of the 
“Preliminary Discourse” of the Traité, raises the distinct possibility that 
the Chemical Revolution may have been inspired by a philosophy.  
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If this were so, it would be a highly exceptional case, worthy of our 
attention.  Why would Lavoisier, at the same time as he strives to 
break with scientific tradition, accept his subjection to a 
philosopher? The Traité is thus presented as a scientific experience 
that corroborates Condillac’s theses.  
 
Lavoisier extracts from Condillac’s work (particularly his Logique) an 
interpretation of the situation and a diagnosis of the difficulties 
faced by Chemistry: the illness is of linguistic origin.  False ideas are 
channeled through words; scientific errors are linguistic errors.  Thus 
Lavoisier finds in Condillac justification for the elaboration of a 
nomenclature, and reciprocally it does not do Condillac any harm 
that an eminent scientist of his day sould corroborate his 
philosophical theses.  But along with this, Lavoisier also justifies a 
disregard for tradition: a negative conception of history as 
interweaving of errors and prejudices that must be set aside so as to 
rediscover nature.  In his Traité de la Sensation, Condillac develops 
his convictions about the formation of ideas and points to its 
similarity with the formation of a –chemical— body composed of 
simple bodies, that is to say, Lavoisier’s Chemistry.  
 
The “Preliminary Discourse” (1789) starts by staing that when 
Lavoisier began to elaborate this Traité, he had set out to develop 
something more than the Méthode of 1787, 
 
But I understood better in dealing with this text that until then I had not 
proven the principles established by Abbé Condillac in his Logic and 
in some of his other works.  He established that we do not think but 
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with the aid of words; that languages are true analytic methods; that 
the simplest, most exact and adequate algebra in the way of 
expressing its object, is at the same time a language and an analytic 
method; in short, that that art of reasoning is no more than a well-
made language.  And in fact, while I thought I was only dealing with 
nomenclature, while my only aim was to perfect the chemical 
language, I was not aware that the task changed in my hands, and 
without my will, into an elementary treatise of Chemistry. (1789 p.1-2, 
italics added)  
 
And so the name of a substance is, in Lavoisier’s words, “the faithful 
mirror of its composition”, as the name constitutes the inverted 
image of the analysis carried out in the laboratory.  The 
nomenclature is more than a lexicon that reflects Lavoisier’s 
laboratory practices: it defines a world trapped between the 
analysis carried out by the scientist and the catalogue of names 
collected by the author of the nomenclator.  This is Lavoisier’s feat: 
a new way of speaking and doing.  He creates an elemental 
Chemistry in both senses of the expression: built on the basis of the 
elements and extremely simple, accessible to children as he says in 
the “Preliminary Discourse”, and, particularly, to anyone who 
“knows nothing about Chemistry”.   
 
However, there remain even in the Traité certain ambiguities of 
Lavoisier’s system: 
 
a) Despite attempting to do away with the Chemistry of principles, 
Lavoisier does not eliminate all the element-principles: do caloric 
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and oxygen not play the role of principles in the proper sense of 
the word, as universal mediators of all reactions? 
b) Even when Lavoisier pretends to renounce the tradition which 
looked for elements and principles, he does not rule out its terms 
(he actually does so only in the case of ‘phlogiston’).  A curious 
oversight in someone so fastidiously concerned with errors 
transmitted through language.  As we have seen, “element” is 
the equivalent of “simple body” in Lavoisier’s Chemistry. 
c) The break with tradition is neither total nor clear. However, in the 
opinion of many chemists and historians of Chemistry, Lavoisier’s 
revolutionary intention was stronger than his acts.  His work poses 
in History as a revolution.  A revolution attributable to a single 
man, even though it is the labor of a whole generation of 
chemists, as I have suggested.  Shortly before his death in 1792, 
he writes:  
 
 “This theory is not, as I often hear, the theory of French chemists: it is 
mine and this is a property that I claim before my contemporaries 
and posterity” (quoted in Berthelot, 1890 p. 143, italics added) 
 
d) Shortly before Lavoisier’s death, an essential element of his 
system is attacked, something that should have at the very least 
caused the word “oxygen” to be abandoned.  In 1819, Hamphry 
Davy, the British chemist who until the end of his days was 
convinced that Lavoisier had not substituted phlogiston theory, 
showed that muriatic acid did not contain oxygen (the universal 
acidifying principle) and isolated chlorine (another acidifying 
substance that takes part in combustions and calcinations). A 
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capital discovery, since it overthrew oxygen as the universal 
principle of acidity.  
 
In fact, Lavoisier seemed to attribute to language changes a 
political rather than a conceptual or theoretical role; in order to 
institute his Chemistry he resorts to a philosopher, not to science, to 
find the means for this new institution.  If we reform language and 
we teach it to all those who know nothing about Chemistry, we will 
soon achieve the obliteration of tradition, historical concealment 
and perhaps the material conditions for incommensurability.  The 
old language did not prevent Lavoisier from conceiving, formulating 
and propagating his discoveries; neither did it pose any 
epistemological difficulties whatsoever to other researches who 
learned Chemistry through Lavoisier’s nomenclature. The scientific 
language that Lavoisier used in order to produce his conceptual 
changes was the old one, but in order to impose those changes he 
needed to produce a new nomenclature.  What relationship is 
established here between language and concept? The new 
concepts were shaped from the old lexicon; the new concepts 
were reformulated in the new nomenclature.  I insist: the Traité is 
nothing other than a summary of the Mémoires presented by 
Lavoisier to the Académie des Sciences.  There can be conceptual 
change, therefore, without linguistic change, as Lavoisier’s whole 
oeuvre demonstrates.  Of course, ‘phlogiston’ does not appear in 
the nomenclature, but ‘caloric’, ‘fire matter’, or ‘heat matter’ do.  
What do these expressions refer to? Those same ones that 
‘phlogiston’ also denoted, as I have tried to prove. When both 
referent and reference exist, can there be no concept?  Lavoisier 
  
33 
33 
had his misgivings about the referent of ‘caloric’, but he bets on its 
existence.  In Réflexions we find the following statement:  
 
I do not deny that the existence of this fluid [he is talking about heat 
matter] might be, up to a certain point, hypothetical; but even 
assuming that it is a hypothesis which has not been rigorously 
proven, it is the only one that I am obliged to formulate.  The 
followers of the phlogiston theory are no more advanced than me 
on this matter, and if the existence of the igneous fluid is in fact a 
hypothesis, it is a common hypothesis to both our systems.” (1783 
p.641, square brackets and italics added) 
 
And this is the formulation of Traité élémentaire de chimie, six years 
later: 
 
These phenomena are hard to conceive without admitting that they 
are the effect of real and material substance, of a very subtle fluid 
that comes through the molecules of all bodies, separating them; and 
even assuming that the existence of this fluid is in fact a hypothesis, it 
will be shown blow that it explains natural phenomena in a very 
felicitous way  … In consequence, we have named the cause of 
heat, the eminently elastic fluid that produces it,  with the name of 
caloric.. (1789 p.19) 
 
Lavoisier will explain with great precision why he proposes this new 
word.  It is not because there is a conceptual change; ‘caloric’ 
does not reflect this kind of change.  For Lavoisier, it is a question of 
stylistics:  
 
 This was what led me, in the Mémoire I published in 1777, to design it 
with the name of igneous fluid and heat matter.  Later, in the work we 
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wrote in collaboration Morveau, Berthollet, and Fourcroy on the 
reformation of chemical language, we believed these periphrases 
that lengthen discourse, make it tiresome, less precise, less clear, and 
even frequently do not imply sufficiently clear ideas. In consequence, 
we have designed the cause of heat, the eminently elastic fluid that 
produces it, with the name of caloric. (1789 p.19)  
 
A linguistic change does not necessarily imply a conceptual 
change, and nor does a conceptual change necessarily imply a 
linguistic change. 
 
 
 5. Conclusion: presence, existence, reference. 
 
If a substance is present in an object, that substance exists.  From 
the contrary fact that a substance is not present in an object it is not 
inferred, however, that this substance does not exist elsewhere or in 
a different form.  Keeping in mind this platitude was very useful for 
my reading Lavoisier’s texts against the phlogiston theory.  However, 
and despite its transparency, this idea is often disregarded.  In 
general, from the existence of something, its sensorial or 
observational presence is inferred, but the reciprocal statement is 
not true, which is the logically correct one; we are so used to the 
kind of information that the senses provides that, at times, this way 
of knowing tricks us.   
 
When Lavoisier discovers that phlogiston is not contained in 
combustible bodies, he rejects the term and all the descriptions 
associated to the term except one: the primitive description that 
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bound it rigidly to fire matter.  He later re-baptizes the same object 
with the name ‘caloric’.  Nothing much happens to the initial 
description or the object to which it was causally bound: fire matter 
is not found fixed to bodies, it is free but it can and does combine in 
important proportions with aeriform bodies, in lesser proportions with 
earthy bodies, and it does not combine with water.    
 
If fire matter could cause the designation of ‘phlogiston’, it also 
caused that of ‘caloric’. What mediated between both terms? 
Scientific research and two clear intentions on Lavoisier’s part: to 
continue referring to fire matter, on the one hand, and on the other 
to eliminate the causal chain of references of his phlogistic 
contemporaries.  
 
Let us reflect for a moment on this quote from Mémoire sur la 
combustion en générale (1777): 
 
Bodies cannot burn but in a small number of kind of air, or rather, 
there cannot be combustion but in a single kind of air, that which 
Priestley has denominated dephlogisticized air and I will call pure air. 
(1777 p.226) 
 
Priestley may have agreed with Lavoisier on giving the expression 
‘dephlogisticized air’ the name ‘pure air’.  But he never agreed with 
Lavoisier’s own and innovative idea that “there cannot be 
combustion except in a single kind of air”.  It was not a problem of 
language, of terms: it was a severe theoretical discrepancy, which 
bore fruit in Hamphry Davy’s discovery, several years later, that 
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combustion does not take place exclusively in the presence of 
oxygen: it also takes place in the presence of other substances.  
Priestley’s suspicions and misgivings may have had – they did have--  
a theoretical and empirical foundation.    
 
I have interpreted ‘caloric’ as the linguistic substitute of ‘phlogiston’, 
appealing in so doing to the felicitous reference of the term. 
Lavoisier was convinced of the substantiality, materiality and reality 
of caloric; however, being also aware that his proposal did not rest 
on sufficient experimental proof, he wields a logical argument of 
persuasion: should anyone (other than Lavoisier) be uncertain 
about the materiality, substantiality and reality of caloric, they 
should appeal to the idea that it is an ad-hoc explanatory 
hypothesis.  Lavoisier does not expect to persuade others about the 
materiality, substantitality and reality of caloric; he expects, in this 
Traité, to be understood, and to this end he will appeal to the one 
feature that phlogiston and caloric shared: its (prima facie) 
hypothetical character. From this it can in no way be inferred that 
Lavoisier himself was uncertain about the substantiality, materiality 
and reality of caloric.  He did have misgivings about its logical 
(Occam’s razor), linguistic and phenomenological nature, but he 
did not have conceptual, referential or ontological qualms.  It is 
worth quoting Lavoisier’s words in full: 
 
Being this substance, whatever it may be, the cause of heat, in other 
words, being the sensation we call heat the effect of its 
accumulation, it cannot be designed in a rigorous language with the 
name of heat, because a single denomination cannot express both 
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cause and effect.  (…).  As well as fulfilling our object in the system we 
have adopted, this expression has still an added advantage, which is 
that it can be adapted to all sorts of opinions, since, rigorously 
speaking, we are in no way obliged to assume caloric to be a real 
matter; it suffices for it to be, as will better understood in the light of 
the following lines, any repulsive cause that separates the molecules 
of matter, the effects of which can in this way be examined in an 
abstract and mathematical manner.  
 
Is light a modification of caloric or, rather, is caloric a modification of 
light? It is impossible to settle this question at the present stage in our 
knowledge.  The only certainty is that in a system where the rule of not 
admitting but facts and which avoids as much as possible assuming 
anything beyond what these facts show, different names must be 
used to design provisionally those things that produce different 
effects” (1789 p. 19-20; italics added)8 
 
Lavoisier goes on to point out the “exact ideas” behind the word 
‘caloric’: the material properties of caloric, which act on bodies9.   
 
Since 1777 Lavoisier talked about caloric, but his main contributions 
on this topic must be framed within his works on Physics, in 
collaboration with Laplace, during 1782-1783.  Both aimed to 
measure the exact amount of heat released by combustion.  Their 
publication Mémoire sur la combustion en générale (1777) and sur 
la chaleur (1783) opens with some remarks that, according to 
Berthelot, “have not lost their value even today, after a century of 
intense investigations in all the branches of physics and Chemistry” 
(1890 p. 61) 
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For Lavoisier, heat was a fluid expanded throughout nature, which is 
found in all bodies, having penetrated them in some measure.  It 
can be combined with them, and in this state of combination it 
stops acting on the thermometer and it stops communicating from 
one body to another.  This will be Lavoisier’s thesis about heat since 
1777 and in his last work, Traité,  he explicitly reproduces it.  
 
In Mémoire sur la combustion en générale (1777), Lavoisier mentions 
other conceptions of heat and, as usual, he will discuss them.  One 
of these conceptions is that heat is but the result of an internal, non-
sensible movement of molecules of matter.  To this conception, 
Lavoisier and Laplace oppose the principle of conservation of live 
forces, according to which heat is considered the live force resulting 
from the non-sensible movements of the molecules in a body.  Their 
guiding idea, from a chemical point of view, is an idea of 
Lavoisier’s, who gave a leading role to oxygen during combustion, 
and thought that this gas provides the heat for combustion taking it 
from its own supply (gas = base gas plus fire matter).  The inequality 
between the amounts of heat released by the same weight of 
oxygen combined with different bodies is due to the fact that a 
proportion of heat remained bound to the products of the 
combination.  The authors, says Berthelot, did not know the wider 
notion according to which the heat released from these 
combinations “… does not really pre-exist each one of the 
components of the system, considered separately” (1890 p.106, 
italics added).   
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1 NT: Citations of passages from Lavoisier’s works refer to the French edition. 
2 Bruno Latour (1987) Science in Action. In this text Latour starts to develop his 
famous thesis which I abbreviate here as  “follow the actors”. 
3 I have based my exposition of the evolution of the referent of phlogiston and 
other aspects of the revolution in modern Chemistry, on the following texts: Figuier 
(1881); Berthelot (1890); Lavoisier (1777, 1783, 1783a, 1789) and Bensaude-Vincent 
(1989). I have also consulted extracts from Duhem (1902); Meyerson (1902) and 
Metzger (1930, 1932, 1935). With the exception of Bensaude-Vincent, the 
secondary sources of this text are closer in time to the historical period 
considered.  
4 Matter was considered to be corpuscular both by Lavoisier and Stahl.  The 
“molecules” of bodies were more or less separated.  The fire matter was located 
in the interstices.  The gases, whose molecules were spread apart, were able to 
contain much more fire matter than solids, whose “molecular” structure was 
much more compact.   
5 What Lavoisier accuses Macquer of doing is, in my opinion, the opposite of what 
Lavoisier himself does here. 
6 There are only a small number of works on the language of Chemistry, despite its 
peculiar characteristics and great importance.  I refer the reader to the works of 
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Maurice Crosland (1962, 1978), Historical Studies in the Language of Chemistry.  
This work, even though it is not usually cited, is of great interest for researchers of 
the modern chemical revolution and particularly for all those historians and 
philosophers of science who write about linguistic changes in the history of 
science.   
7 I am here in the antipodes of Paul Hoynigen-Huene (2008). Not only do I 
disagree with the general outline of his work but I’m increasingly persuaded that 
the Chemical Revolution  is not a good example to illustrate the 
incommensurability thesis proposed by Thomas S. Kuhn in any except its 
methodological elucidation, proposed by this author et al. (2001). 
8 I apologize to the reader for the length of this quotation.  Its purpose is 
methodological: it is not right to do History and Philosophy of Science exclusively 
on the basis of secondary sources.   
9  Let us suppose that caloric had the characteristics of a theoretical concept for 
Lavoisier; that is to say, a concept and its respective term attend to the expressive 
needs of his system. Now, if Lavoisier could intervene experimentally in other 
material, substantial and real bodies, with that notion Lavoisier surely had 
experimental and even empirical proof elements à la Hacking (1983) with regards 
to materiality, substantiality and reality of caloric. 
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